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For some entities, such as self-employed 
individuals reporting income taxes or firms 
reporting value-added taxes, the optimal 
evasion rate depends substantially on audit 
features like audit probabilities and penalty 
rates (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). 
Whereas it is easy for firms to find other 
important information such as inflation rates 
or exchange rates, it is difficult to find 
information about the probability of being 
audited and penalty rates. Indeed, Bergolo et 
al. (2017) show evidence that firms have large 
misperceptions about these audit features.1 In 
 
1 Previous studies have used surveys to measure misperceptions 
about audit probabilities (e.g., Harris et al., 1988; Hessing et al., 
1992; Sheffrin and Triest, 1992). The evidence from Bergolo et al. 
(2017) has two main advantages. First, compared to previous surveys 
that use samples of the general population, Bergolo et al. (2017) focus 
on a population whose stakes of misperceiving the auditing process 
can be substantial. Second, Bergolo et al. (2017) combine survey and 
internal administrative data from the tax agency, which provides a 
more straightforward comparison of perceptions and reality. 
this paper, we expand their analysis to explore 
the sources of these misperceptions. 
I. Data 
See Bergolo et al. (2017) for details about 
the survey design and implementation. In a 
nutshell, the anonymous online survey was 
conducted in collaboration with the Internal 
Revenue Service (henceforth, IRS) from 
Uruguay. The invitations were sent by email 
on May 2016 to a sample of 6,181 firms with 
valid email addresses -- whereas Bergolo et al. 
(2017) focuses on firms participating in a field 
experiment, we extend the analysis to a 
broader sample. The average firm invited to 
the survey had 5.24 employees, had been in 
existence for 14 years, and paid $7,887 in 
value added taxes and $5,265 in other taxes 
over the previous year.2  
Of the 6,181 firms invited to the survey, 
3,628 (59%) responded. By request of the 
IRS, responses to all survey questions were 
 
2 All monetary amounts are expressed in USD, converted from the 
original Uruguayan pesos using the exchange rate from August 23, 
2015. This sample draws heavily from small and medium firms. In 
the universe of firms, the average number of employees is 10.40, the 
average age is 13.45 years, and the payment is $19.800 in value-
added taxes and $10,943 in other taxes. 
 
voluntary. Across all questions, the average 
share of missing responses is 52%. 
One question elicited the perceived 
probability of being audited: “In your opinion, 
what is the probability that the tax returns 
filed by a company like yours will be audited 
at least in one of the next three years (from 
0% to 100%)?” We used a three-year period, 
because when selected for an audit, IRS 
investigates the firm’s activity over the past 
three years. Another question elicited the 
perceived penalty rate: “Let us imagine that a 
company like yours is audited and that tax 
evasion is detected. What, in your opinion, is 
the penalty (in %) as determined by law that 
the firm must pay in addition to the originally 
unpaid amount? For example, a fee of X% 
means that, for each $100 not paid, the firm 
would have to pay those original $100 plus $X 
in penalties.” After each question, we elicited 
certainty in the response using a 1-to-5 scale, 
from “Not sure at all” to “Very sure.” 
To estimate the “actual” audit probability 
and penalty rate, we use administrative data 
from the IRS for the sample of firms invited to 
the survey. The actual audit probability is 
calculated as the percentage of firms that were 
audited at least once in 2011–2013. The 
average penalty rate is calculated among firms 
who were caught evading in 2011–2013. 
II. Average Misperceptions 
Figure 1 shows a histogram of the 
distribution of perceived audit probability 
among the survey respondents. The vertical 
line corresponds to the actual value of audit 
probability among the firms invited to the 
survey. Figure 1 suggests that most of the 
firms misperceive the audit probability. 
Moreover, there is a systematic positive Bias: 
the average perceived probability (39.50%) is 
substantially higher than reality (7.98%), with 
a statistically significant difference (p < .001). 
FIGURE 1. PERCEIVED AUDIT PROBABILITY  
 
Notes: N=1,791. The bars represent the distribution of survey 
responses. The vertical line is the actual probability of being audited. 
 
FIGURE 2. PERCEIVED PENALTY RATE 
 
Notes: N=1,671. The bars represent the distribution of survey 
responses. The vertical line is the actual penalty rate. 
One potential explanation for this 
overestimation of audit probability is given by 
the availability heuristic model (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1974): audits are arguably 
salient events and thus seem more frequent 
than they are. 
Figure 2 provides the same analysis as 
Figure 1, using perceived penalty rates instead 
of perceived audit probabilities. Again, most 
firms misperceive the average penalty rate. 
However, there is no systematic Bias in 
perceived penalty rates. The average 
perceived penalty (31.37%) is close to the 
actual average (31.91%), with a statistically 
insignificant difference (p = .462).  
III. Heterogeneity Analysis 
In this section, we present some 
heterogeneity analyses to explore the sources 
of these misperceptions. Table 1 summarizes 
the misperceptions using two measures. Panel 
A shows the results for the entire sample.  
Bias corresponds to the average difference 
between perceptions and reality. MAE, which 
stands for Mean Absolute Error, corresponds 
to the average absolute difference between 
perceptions and reality. 
First, we explore whether these 
misperceptions are driven primarily by less 
sophisticated agents, who either do not have 
access to the relevant information or have no 
interest in accessing it. To explore this 
hypothesis, we exploit survey data on the self-
identification of respondents. 
 
TABLE 1— RESULTS BY SUBGROUPS OF RESPONDENTS 
 Audit Probability Penalty 
 Bias MAE N Bias MAE N 
Panel A. All 31.53 33.26 1,791 -0.54 23.59 1,671 
  (0.643)  (0.592)   (0.736)  (0.457)  
Panel B. By Occupation of Respondent 
Accountants 33.80 35.13 331 -0.56 22.50 314 
  (1.531)  (1.437)   (1.631)  (1.022)  
Non-Accountants 31.05 32.80 1,370 -0.39 23.88 1278 
  (0.729)  (0.670)   (0.851)  (0.527)  
Panel C. By Size 
>1 Employee 32.95 35.27 605 0.89 22.79 565 
  (1.066)  (0.935)   (1.252)  (0.804)  
≤1 Employee 34.34 35.05 527 -4.36 24.15 483 
  (1.207)  (1.167)   (1.317)  (0.752)  
Panel D. By Age of the Firm 
> = 12 Years 30.50 32.22 807 -1.37 22.99 755 
  (0.918)  (0.842)   (1.068)  (0.664)  
< 12 Years 32.78 34.52 716 -0.168 23.92 668 
  (1.051)  (0.970)   (1.181)  (0.733)  
Panel E. By History of Audits    
Audited 11–13 46.43 47.06 209 3.24 24.74 188 
  (1.773)  (1.691)   (2.364)  (1.539)  
Not-Audited 11–13 29.10 31.02 1,397 -1.27 23.34 1,307 
  (0.706)  (0.645)   (0.819)  (0.504)  
Panel F. By Tax Morale 
High Tax Morale 32.72 34.38 1,010 1.80 25.02 965 
 (0.849) (0.782)  (1.027) (0.639)  
Low Tax Morale 28.39 30.12 583 -4.17 20.67 554 
 (1.089) (1.006)  (1.102) (0.688)  
Panel G. By Degree of Confidence in Response 
High Confidence 31.96 34.88 760 0.49 25.12 879 
  (1.118)  (1.075)   (1.081)  (0.671)  
Low Confidence 31.06 31.91 1,016 -1.58 21.92 787 
  (0.694)  (0.655)   (0.991)  (0.611)  
Panel H. By Responses Equal or Different to 50 
Exactly 50 42.03 42.03 652 18.09 18.09 212 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  
Not Exactly 50 25.52 28.24 1,139 -3.25 24.39 1,459 
  (0.967)  (0.592)   (0.820)  (0.521)  
       
Notes: Bias is the average difference between perception. MAE is the 
average absolute difference between perception and reality. N is the 
total number of non-missing responses. For all panels but C and H, 
we compare the survey responses to the same estimates of actual 
probability (7.97%) and average penalty rate (31.91%). In Panels C 
and H, the actual values of the parameters are computed by 
subgroups. In Panel C, small firms have an actual probability of being 
audited of 3.47% and an average penalty rate of 34.12%; large firms 
have an actual probability of being audited of 11.92% and an average 
penalty rate of 31.33%. In Panel H, older firms have an actual 
probability of being audited of 8.93% and an average penalty of 
31.99%; newer firms have an actual audit probability of 6.97% and an 
average penalty of 31.80%. Source: Author calculations based on 
survey and administrative data. 
 
 
Panel B of Table 1 breaks down the results 
by accountants (supposed experts on the topic) 
and non-accountants. Although some 
differences are statistically significant, the 
differences in misperceptions (as measured by 
Bias or MAE) are economically small across 
accountants and non-accountants, and the 
direction of these differences is not robust. 
This evidence refutes the hypothesis that less 
sophisticated agents drive most 
misperceptions. 
The presence of misperceptions does not 
necessarily imply that firms are irrational. If 
the cost of searching for information is high 
enough, rational inattention models would 
predict some misperceptions. Given that this is 
a high-stakes environment where the average 
firm in the sample pays about $13,152 in taxes 
per year, rational inattention does not seem 
like a plausible explanation. 
To provide more direct evidence on the 
rational inattention channel, Panel C of Table 
1 breaks down the results by number of 
employees. Firms with fewer than two 
employees pay an average of $8,921 in taxes 
per year, whereas firms with two or more 
employees pay an average of $16,855. 
According to the rational inattention model, 
larger firms should have smaller 
misperceptions, because their stakes are 
higher. Although some differences are 
statistically significant, the differences in 
misperceptions are small across smaller and 
larger firms. For example, the MAE in 
perceived probability is 35.27 for larger firms 
and 35.05 for smaller firms (p = .885). Thus, 
find no suggestive evidence of rational 
inattention. 
If a firm does not have access to other 
information sources, it may have to rely on its 
own history of audits as the main source of 
information. Panel D provides one test of this 
hypothesis by breaking down the results by 
firm age. Intuitively, older firms have more 
time than newer ones to gather information 
about the auditing process. Again, although 
some differences are statistically significant, 
the differences in misperceptions between 
older and younger firms are economically 
small. This evidence indicates that 
misperceptions can persist for decades. 
Panel E provides related evidence by 
comparing firms that were audited at least 
once in the previous three years and firms that 
were not. Consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms use their own audit histories as their 
main data sources, firms recently audited have 
higher perceived audit probabilities. This 
effect results in a higher Bias for firms with 
recent audit history (46.43 vs. 29.10, p < .001) 
and a higher MAE (47.06 vs. 31.02, p < .001). 
Compared to the perceived penalty rate, the 
results go in the same direction, but the 
differences are economically and statistically 
less significant. This finding suggests that this 
channel at least partially explains how direct 
contact with audits plays an important role in 
misperceptions about audit probabilities. 
Some firms might pay their taxes because 
they think it is the right thing to do. For these 
firms, audits are irrelevant to their decision-
making, and thus they have no incentive to be 
informed about the auditing process. 
According to this view, misperceptions may 
be driven exclusively by firms with high tax 
morale. To test this hypothesis, we use 
responses to a survey question that measures 
tax morale: “On a Scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is 
‘Not justifiable at all’ and 5 is ‘Completely 
justifiable,’ how much do you think it is 
justifiable to evade taxes?” Panel F breaks 
down the results by high morale (value 1 in 
the score) and low morale (values 2 to 5). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, firms with 
higher tax morale have higher Bias and higher 
MAE than firms with lower tax morale. 
However, although these differences are 
statistically significant, they are moderate in 
magnitude. For example, the difference in 
MAE regarding audit probability is 34.38 
versus 30.12 (p < .001). 
We also explore whether firms are self-
aware of their misperceptions by looking at 
the self-reported confidence in responses. 
When asked about audit probabilities, 42.60% 
of subjects reported to be sure or very sure 
about their answers, whereas 57.40% of 
subjects reported to be a little sure or not sure 
at all. The distribution of confidence is similar 
for the perceived audit penalty. In other 
words, firms are aware of their misperceptions 
from a collective perspective. 
To further explore this question, Panel G of 
Table 1 splits the results by firms that reported 
high-versus-low confidence in their responses. 
We find that, despite some statistically 
significant differences in misperceptions, 
these differences are economically small and 
point in the opposite direction than predicted. 
Last, we address a confounding factor. It is 
possible that misperceptions are spuriously 
driven by firms that responded exactly 50% as 
a way of expressing that they are uncertain 
(Bruine de Bruin and Carman, 2012).3 
Since misperceptions are similar between 
firms that are certain and firms that are 
uncertain, this confounding factor seems 
unlikely to account for the findings. As 
additional evidence, Panel H breaks down the 
results by firms that responded exactly 50% 
and firms that did not. By construction, the 
 
3 For instance, among firms that report an audit probability of 
50%, the fraction that report “Not sure” or “A bit sure” is 50.92%; in 
comparison, among firms that report an audit probability different 
from 50%, the fraction that reports “Not sure” or “A bit sure” is 
29.06%. This difference is statistically significant (p <.001). 
 
Bias and MAE are higher for firms reporting 
50%. However, the misperceptions are still 
substantial even after dropping responses of 
50%. In other words, although this issue with 
the survey responses may inflate the degree of 
misperceptions, it is far from explaining the 
whole puzzle. 
IV. Conclusions 
We present measures of perceptions about 
the auditing process in a sample of 6,181 firms 
from Uruguay. We find large misperceptions 
about audit probabilities and penalty rates. We 
also find a systematic overestimation of audit 
probabilities but no such overestimation for 
penalty rates. Of all the channels that we 
explore, recent contact with audits best 
explains differences in misperceptions. 
These findings have direct policy 
implications. The high level of misperceptions 
may be attributed to the lack of publicly 
available and easily accessible information 
about the auditing process. Our results suggest 
that if tax authorities were more transparent 
about the auditing process, perceived audit 
probabilities would decrease, which could in 
turn reduce tax compliance. Thus, it may be in 
the best interest of tax agencies to reduce 
transparency. Indeed, this may be why tax 
authorities do not share this information. 
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